Not Fit-for-Purpose

The Grand Experiment of Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives in Corporate Accountability, Human Rights and Global Governance

SUMMARY REPORT

MSI Integrity

JULY 2020
About MSI Integrity

The Institute for Multi-Stakeholder Initiative Integrity (MSI Integrity) aims to reduce the harms and human rights abuses caused or exacerbated by the private sector. For the past decade, MSI Integrity has investigated whether, when and how multi-stakeholder initiatives protect and promote human rights. The culmination of this research is available in this report: Not Fit-for-Purpose.

We are now embarking on a new direction: applying lessons learned from the grand experiment in multi-stakeholderism to promote business models that center worker and communities in their governance and ownership.

See our new work: Beyond Corporations.

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GET IN TOUCH
For more information, please email us at info@msi-integrity.org.

FIND OUT MORE
Download the full report at www.msi-integrity.org/not-fit-for-purpose/
Find out about our new direction at www.msi-integrity.org/beyond-corporations/
Look out for our upcoming blog series, “Rethinking MSIs.”

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What is a standard-setting multistakeholder initiative?

Stakeholders gather to address human rights or environmental harms linked to business activity.

Sometimes right holders can raise complaints or report violations of an MSI’s standards.

Multinational companies

Governments

Civil society organizations

No forced labor!

Which impact right holders

MSI Board

Sets standards

Non-compliance = auditor or board may sanction

Compliance = certification or membership

Usually auditors monitor the company (or sometimes government) for compliance with standards

Standards

No child labor. No deforestation. Protect privacy.
MSIs At A Glance

This report looks at 40 international standard-setting MSIs

**AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY + FISHING**
Better Cotton Initiative
Bonsucro
Equitable Food Initiative
Fairtrade International*
Florverde Sustainable Flowers
Food Alliance
Forest Stewardship Council
Global Coffee Platform
Marine Stewardship Council
Program for Endorsement of Forest Certification
Rainforest Alliance
Roundtable on Responsible Soy
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil
Sustainable Forestry Initiative
UTZ Certified

**CONSUMER GOODS**
Ethical Trading Initiative***
Fair Labor Association***
Fair Wear Foundation
GoodWeave International
ICTI Ethical Toy Program
Social Accountability International
Worldwide Responsible Accredited Production

**CONSUMER SERVICES**
Global Sustainable Tourism Council

**INDUSTRIALS**
Infrastructure Transparency Initiative
International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers

**MINING + ENERGY**
Alliance for Responsible Mining
Better Biomass
Diamond Development Initiative
Equitable Origin
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)
Fair Stone
Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Protocol
International Sustainability and Carbon Certification**
Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance
Roundtable on Sustainable Biomaterials
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights

**TECHNOLOGY**
Global Network Initiative

**ALL INDUSTRY / OTHER**
Alliance for Water Stewardship
Global Reporting Initiative
UN Global Compact

* Also operates in the Consumer Goods industry.
** Also operates in the Industrials and the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing industries.
***Also operates in the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing industries.
What Industries Do MSIs Operate In?

- 40% Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing
- 27.5% Mining + Energy
- 15% Consumer Goods
- 7.5% Industrials
- 5% Consumer Services
- 2.5% Technology

80% of surveyed MSIs set standards for just one industry and 20% set standards for two or more industries. Almost all of the industry-specific MSIs are clustered in three sectors:

- Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing
- Mining and Energy
- Consumer Goods

There are no industry-specific MSIs for:

- Health Care
- Financial Services

Who Has The Power To Make Decisions In MSIs?

Among MSIs that publicly disclose information about the composition of their primary decision-making body:

- 98% include both industry and civil society representatives;
- 40% include government representatives;
- 13% include affected populations; and
- 33% include other* representatives.

*Other includes: other MSIs, socially responsible investors, independent consultants, etc.

Representation of Stakeholder Groups in MSI Decision-Making Bodies

- Civil Society: 39
- Industry: 38
- Government: 16
- Affected Populations: 5
- Other: 13

These Initiatives...

Operate in over 170 countries & engage over 50 national governments & 10,000+ companies

Timeline of MSI Formation

- 1992-1996: 4
- 1997-2001: 11
- 2002-2006: 12
- 2007-2011: 10
- 2012-2017: 3

What Do MSIs Address?

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Executive Summary

When MSIs first emerged in the 1990s, they appeared to offer a transformative and exciting proposition. For years human rights and advocacy organizations had been investigating and naming-and-shaming companies for their connections to sweatshop labor, deforestation, corruption, and other abusive behavior. As this advocacy grew louder—and as government regulation of corporations remained elusive—a new experiment began. Rather than being barred from boardrooms, some large civil society organizations began working alongside businesses to draft codes of conduct, create industry oversight mechanisms, and design novel systems of multi-stakeholder governance that aimed to protect rights holders and benefit communities.

These international standard-setting MSIs rapidly proliferated. By the 2000s, they had become a “gold standard” of voluntary business and human rights initiatives, encompassing everything from freedom of expression on the internet to the certification of palm oil as “sustainable.” Within two decades—and with minimal critical examination into its effectiveness or wider impacts—multi-stakeholderism had evolved from a new and untested experiment in global governance into a widely accepted solution to international human rights abuses.

But have MSIs delivered on their promise to protect human rights?

After reflecting on a decade of research and analysis, our assessment is that this grand experiment has failed. MSIs are not effective tools for holding corporations accountable for abuses, protecting rights holders against human rights violations, or providing survivors and victims with access to remedy. While MSIs can be important and necessary venues for learning, dialogue, and trust-building between corporations and other stakeholders—which can sometimes lead to positive rights outcomes—they should not be relied upon for the protection of human rights. They are simply not fit for this purpose.

It is time to rethink the role of MSIs. The presence of an MSI should not be a substitute for public regulation. MSIs do not eliminate the need to protect rights holders from corporate abuses through effective regulation and enforcement. To the contrary, the existence of an MSI should put governments—as well as MSIs and their supporters—on notice that a governance gap exists, and that they need to supplement the voluntary efforts of that MSI with mandatory measures at local, national, and international levels.

Arriving at these conclusions did not come suddenly. They are the culmination of research and analysis that began in 2010 at Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic. Our engagement began with an observation: as MSIs became a default response to governance gaps, the question of their effectiveness was not only going unanswered, it was often going unasked. This led to a process of systematically exploring questions about the effectiveness of standard-setting MSIs from a human rights perspective, ultimately resulting in the incubation of MSI Integrity. Since independently launching our organization, we have sought to understand the human rights impact and value of MSIs, developing evaluative tools and resources to foster debate and learning about MSIs, and conducting research into underexamined issues. In the course of our work, we have interviewed hundreds of stakeholders, from MSI staff and members, to individual rights holders; conducted and collated research into pressing issues, including analyzing more than 1,500 pages of MSI procedures and policies; observed the meetings and assessed the practices of individual MSIs; and hosted or participated in almost 50 learning events, from panels on the effectiveness of MSIs at the United Nations Forum on Business and Human Rights to small hands-on workshops to design robust accountability mechanisms in MSIs.
This report is a collection of the key insights into MSIs we have gained over the past decade. Central to our approach is the understanding of standard-setting MSIs as a field. While each MSI is unique in its history and context, the MSIs that we have examined—and that are in our MSI Database—are a set of institutions that share a common architecture: (1) governance by a multi-stakeholder body; (2) the creation of transnational standards that include or affect human rights; and (3) the establishment of mechanisms designed to offer assurances that their members are complying with their standards (e.g., monitoring, reporting, or grievance mechanisms).

The report identifies six cross-cutting insights, as summarized on page 9. While they are broad conclusions and may not apply equally to every MSI, in combination they paint a clear picture: MSIs have not been operating or designed to ensure that corporations respect human rights, companies (or governments) are held accountable for abuses, or rights holders have adequate access to remedy for abuses. The results have left the aspiration of rights protection unfulfilled, as seen in the continuation of major human rights abuses—including, for example, child labor and forced labor—in industries and by companies covered by MSIs. MSIs have not closed the governance gaps that provide companies with a permissive environment for abusive conduct.

This is not to say that MSIs cannot play a role in the promotion of human rights, or that they have not had successes. Many participants in MSIs have reported the positive opportunities that MSIs present for learning, relationship-building, and experimentation, all of which represent functions that MSIs are well-suited to serve. But as robust rights protection or accountability institutions, MSIs have failed. Instead, MSIs have increasingly evolved to replicate traditional power structures, which has meant that they better serve corporate interests than those of rights holders. Ultimately, the hopes and expectation of governments, MSIs, consumers, businesses, civil society organizations, or others that this grand experiment in voluntarism would actually close governance gaps, have proved unfounded.

Two features have intrinsically limited the capacities of MSIs to protect rights. First, MSIs are not rights holder-centric. In general, MSIs employ a top-down approach to addressing human rights concerns, which fails to center the needs, desires, or voices of rights holders: the people whose living and working conditions are the ultimate focus of MSIs, whether they are farm workers, communities living near resource extraction sites, or internet users. Our research and experiences have shown that there is little meaningful emphasis in MSIs on empowering rights holders to know and exercise their rights, or to directly engage in the governance or implementation of initiatives. Centering rights holders is essential, however, for the efficacy of any initiative that purports to address human rights. Rights holders hold critical information for ensuring that standard-setting and implementation processes respond to their lived experiences. For example, what rights issues and remedies are of greatest importance to be addressed? What sort of whistleblower protections or oversight systems are needed for people to feel safe reporting alleged abuse? Are interventions actually working? Top-down approaches risk failing to harness the knowledge or trust of those whose lives or rights are at stake.

Second, MSIs have not fundamentally restricted corporate power or addressed the power imbalances that drive abuse. Companies have preserved their autonomy and safeguarded their interests throughout the design, governance, and implementation of MSIs. The mechanisms most central to rights protection, such as systems for detecting or remediating abuses, have been structurally weak. This has meant that MSIs are capable of achieving positive outcomes where there is genuine commitment on the part of corporate members to change; however, when that goodwill breaks down—as it often has—MSIs have been able to do little to protect human rights.

To us, these insights underscore the need for two major steps to be taken in order to provide meaningful rights protection and address corporate-related abuses.
Rethink the role of MSIs

A. Recognize that MSIs are tools for corporate-engagement rather than instruments of human rights protection.

The appropriate role for, and limitations of, MSIs need to be more accurately articulated and understood. MSIs should be recognized for what they have been equipped to do well: to be forums for building trust, experimentation, and learning. To the extent that MSIs set standards and adopt practices that are human rights-maximizing (which is not always the case; see Insight 3: Standards & Scope), they can also potentially have a positive role in norm creation and policy reform. However, MSIs should no longer be viewed as institutions that robustly ensure that their corporate members respect rights, provide access to remedy, or hold corporations accountable for abuses. They are simply not sufficiently resourced or structured to carry out these difficult functions. Regulation is needed for these purposes.

To the extent that any form of private governance can be effective in these protection or accountability realms (which is an issue that requires more exploration) such mechanisms need to overcome the current failings of MSIs. This means they need to be rights holder-centric and address corporate power such that the regulated entity is not controlling the institution, neither formally nor informally. We note that this is possible, as these are the bedrock principles of Worker-driven Social Responsibility (WSR) initiatives that have emerged as counterpoints to MSIs. WSR initiatives are designed by and for workers and include legally enforceable standards.

What are appropriate roles for MSIs?

- Protecting human rights
- Providing access to effective remedy
- Closing governance gaps
- Holding corporations accountable for abuse
- Norm creation and diffusion *
- Policy reform *
- Building trust and relationships
- Learning and knowledge exchange
- Experimentation
- Engaging corporations

* Care needs to be taken to ensure that the standards MSIs adopt and/or advocate for appropriately reflect the views and needs of rights holders and are rights-maximizing. Otherwise, there is a risk that MSIs will only promote positions that are profit-aligned, or that reflect the views and interests of corporations and the other stakeholders who are sufficiently resourced and empowered to participate in MSIs.
B. Recognize that MSIs must be supplemented with public regulation.

The presence of an MSI, or any form of private governance, should not be a substitute for public regulation. To the contrary, the existence of MSIs should signal to stakeholders that there are governance gaps that need to be filled.

The presence of an MSI within an industry or an issue field does not, by itself, satisfy the state duty to protect rights holders from corporate abuses. Rather, the existence of an MSI should put governments on notice—particularly governments whose companies participate in MSIs, or governments in whose jurisdictions MSIs are operating—that a governance gap exists and that they need to act alongside the voluntary efforts of that MSI with mandatory measures at local, national, and international levels. Such measures should establish the legal liability of companies for human rights violations, ensure rights holders have access to an effective remedy, and provide incentives and robust frameworks to prevent abuses. Importantly, given their structural weaknesses, neither participating in MSIs nor following their monitoring, reporting, or related processes should necessarily be appropriate evidence of sufficient due diligence.

This is what it means in the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights to have a “smart mix” of measures: not that voluntary efforts, such as MSIs, can replace mandatory efforts, or vice-versa, but rather that the two must work alongside each other.¹ This is not to say that hard law should always be viewed as a panacea or the singular approach. An evolving web of human rights protections, built from a strong foundation of public regulation and supplemented by voluntary efforts that aim to raise the floor of regulation, will offer greater protections for rights holders.

2 Challenge the Corporate Form

Center workers and affected communities in corporate governance and ownership.

We believe that the failure of MSIs is inextricably linked to the corporate form itself. Major corporations avoid sharing power with other stakeholders—such as rights holders and affected communities—because to do so threatens their obligations to shareholders and their accumulation and management of profit. As long as corporations are primarily beholden to investors, not only will companies fail to adequately center vulnerable workers or communities in their business decisions, but they will also resist human rights initiatives that threaten their profits or power, and continue to run the unacceptable risk of making decisions that harm people and the planet.

Companies are run and controlled by a board of directors, executive management, and shareholders, who do not directly experience the on-the-ground consequences of the company’s decisions. They are not the people who live near or work in the mine sites, farmland, or factories where the repercussions of business practices reverberate. Those with power in companies are normally not the rights holders, about whom human rights initiatives are most concerned. This, combined with the fact that boards are legally prohibited from making decisions that prioritize community

or societal interests above the financial interests of shareholders, means that decision makers in a corporation are neither structurally situated nor primarily motivated to consider human rights impacts. Instead, companies are incentivized—and often obligated—to make whatever decisions will maximize shareholder profits, without sharing those returns with workers or affected communities. This has caused extreme economic inequality between those who own or run companies and those who do not.

Therefore, perhaps the most significant and transformative human rights project is one that has received little attention within the human rights domain: challenging the corporation itself and reimagining our economic enterprises. To us, this means developing and promoting business models and policy transformations whereby:

1. **Workers and/or affected communities are at the center of decision-making.** What if businesses were legally and operationally accountable not to shareholders, but to the workers and/or the communities affected by their decisions? What if workplace democracy was a universally recognized human right? What if affected communities and workers determined who governed an organization or how that organization was run?

2. **Benefits and ownership accrue to the workers who generate value for a business and/or to the communities and rights holders who are impacted by its behavior.** What if the primary economic beneficiaries of enterprises were the workers or wider communities impacted by those businesses? What if businesses who contribute a net harm to society lose their legal license to operate?

These are important human rights questions that need urgent attention. There is much to learn from the workers, movements, and individuals who have long been creating and promoting resilient alternatives to the corporation and those fighting for a just, sustainable, and new economy. The lessons learned from the grand experiment of MSIs can also provide important insights: from understanding the conditions under which co-governance between multiple types of stakeholders can—or cannot—function effectively, to ensuring that workers, rights holders, and communities have meaningful decision-making power and do not face barriers to participation within governance structures.

We invite the readers of this report to think critically about the limitations of voluntary regulation and what these insights mean for the future protection of human rights. To us, the failure of the grand experiment in multi-stakeholderism not only underscores that it is time to rethink MSIs and to demand more effective regulation of corporations, but that even the most well-intentioned and carefully-designed interventions will have limitations. The wider human rights movement must now tackle the root cause of business-related human rights abuse: the corporate form.

What do the lessons from this grand experiment mean for you?
Influence
MSIs have been influential as human rights tools, but that influence, along with their credibility, is waning.

Stakeholder Participation
MSIs entrench corporate power by failing to include rights holders and by preventing civil society from acting as an agent of change.

Standards & Scope
Many MSIs adopt weak or narrow standards which risk creating a misperception that abuses are being effectively addressed or that overlook the root causes of abuse.

Monitoring & Compliance
MSIs employ inadequate methods to detect human rights abuses and uphold standards.

Remedy
MSIs are not designed to provide rights holders with access to effective remedy.

Impact
There is little evidence that MSIs are meaningfully protecting rights holders or closing governance gaps.
MSIs have been influential as human rights tools, but that influence, along with their credibility, is waning.

Our analysis of the growth, establishment, and impact of the field of MSIs has led us to the conclusion that the influence of MSIs has peaked. The stamp of legitimacy conferred upon MSIs by powerful international institutions, governments, and civil society organizations (CSOs), epitomized by the inclusion of MSIs in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), gave MSIs significant influence in the field of business and human rights as a prominent response to major governance gaps. Over the past decade, however, growing skepticism among some civil society actors has resulted in a retreat from MSIs, allowing corporate interests to increasingly dominate the field. Instead of being a response to civil society campaigns, the specific failings and concerning practices of MSIs now often make them an advocacy target. This suggests that the influence of MSIs is eroding. In its place is a resurgence in advocacy for public regulation and more accountable private mechanisms, such as the Worker-driven Social Responsibility initiatives, that may better bridge the governance gaps that MSIs had promised to fill.

SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS:

MSIs emerged as a default response in the Global North to many of the major global business-related human rights crises in the 1990s and 2000s. They were often developed with support from Global North governments or large international NGOs. They were often perceived as a compromise between no regulation and mandatory public regulation.

MSIs have enjoyed broad influence in the business and human rights landscape. The support of powerful governments, multinational corporations, and CSOs legitimized MSIs as good practice. Prominent CSOs called for the creation of MSIs and helped found them in many industries. Subsequently, the inclusion of MSIs in the UNGPs crystalized them as a “field” that became increasingly institutionalized and well-resourced.

• MSIs have influenced government action and policy. For example, at least 16 of the 23 National Action Plans that countries have published as part of their efforts to implement the UNGPs include reference to MSIs.

• MSIs have become part of corporate engagement with human rights. Over 10,000 companies participate in MSIs, including 13 of the world’s 20 largest companies by revenue.

• MSIs are part of international frameworks and governance. Individual MSIs have been endorsed by international finance institutions and the UN. They are key reference points for company human rights rating agencies.

• MSIs influence public behavior and perceptions. Many consumers rely on the labels bestowed by MSIs to make ethical consumption decisions.

Over the last few years, growing questions and concerns by those who have closely monitored or participated in MSIs have bolstered long standing civil society criticisms of MSIs:

• A number of CSOs have withdrawn from individual MSIs over concerns about inaction, ineffectiveness, and the resources they consume.

• There are now well-documented instances in which MSIs have failed to detect or remedy human rights abuses. Complaints have been brought against multiple MSIs in OECD National Contact Points.

• The term “MSIs,” which did not have a negative connotation when it was used in the UNGPs, has become increasingly connotative of a corporate-oriented model or a model that is not focused on accountability. “Worker-driven” models have emerged and specifically contrast themselves with MSIs. Such models are growing and may displace MSIs in the medium to long term.

There is growing recognition of the need for government regulation in a “smart mix” of tools to promote business respect for human rights on the premise that voluntary initiatives are not sufficient.
INSIGHT 02: Stakeholder Participation

MSIs entrench corporate power by failing to include rights holders and by preventing civil society from acting as an agent of change.

The perceived legitimacy of MSIs stems from the fact that they include stakeholders—civil society or rights holders—who might act as watchdogs over corporations and drive pro-human rights reforms. However, in practice, MSIs generally exclude rights holders from governance and implementation processes, relying instead on CSOs to counterbalance corporate power. Yet, CSOs are ill-equipped to challenge corporate power within MSI governance due, in part, to their resource constraints, broad diversity, and the fact that they generally need to win the support of corporations to make key decisions. This is exacerbated by the process-oriented nature of MSIs, which favors the status quo and absorbs CSOs’ limited resources. Despite the rhetoric of multi-stakeholderism, in reality, MSIs entrench power in favor of corporations—the entities they seek to regulate. MSIs are thus poorly situated to fulfill “regulatory” functions, such as determining whether to expel non-complying members or fix weaknesses in accountability mechanisms.

SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS:

MSIs have largely excluded rights holders from their governing bodies and implementation. In particular:

• Only 13% of MSIs include affected populations in their governing bodies, and none have a majority of rights holders on their boards.

• The monitoring, compliance, and remedial mechanisms established by MSIs are not centered on rights holders, and the few MSIs that measure their impacts on rights holders do so through top-down studies that do not empower rights holders in their design or implementation.

• CSOs participating in MSIs are not equipped or resourced to act as proxies for rights holders, and their presence does not necessarily mean that those most affected by the relevant issue are represented.

MSIs are premised on CSOs’ ability to perform oversight of their operations. However, MSI decision-making rules and practices, along with differences in resources and capacity between CSOs and other stakeholders, can compromise CSOs’ engagement as equal and effective partners. In particular:

• Multi-stakeholder decision-making rules can favor the status quo by requiring CSOs and their pro-reform allies to garner majority or consensus support for major pro-human rights reforms.

• “Civil society” is a broad constituency often without any clearly defined boundaries. The different backgrounds, agendas, and interests of CSOs can require them to expend considerable effort to arrive at a common strategy and approach within the constituency.

• MSIs are highly technocratic, and effective participation in their governance requires significant financial and technical resources, as well as investments of time. Yet CSOs—particularly those from the Global South—are often poorly resourced compared to their corporate or government constituents. MSIs thus risk reproducing pre-existing Global North/South and corporate/community power imbalances.

• The process-oriented nature of MSIs also opens them up to delays by those resisting change, which further depletes limited CSO resources and may stymie efforts for reform.

Decision-making on pro-human rights reform issues in MSIs is often slow, incremental and resource-intensive.
Many MSIs adopt weak or narrow standards which risk creating a misperception that abuses are being effectively addressed or that overlook the root causes of abuse.

Although MSIs influence industry practices, when closely analyzed from a human rights perspective, certain standards that MSIs adopt are often far from what is considered to be “best practice.” An MSI’s standards may be too weak to lead to change, may fail to address key human rights issues, or may impose burdens primarily on Global South companies or governments without considering the leverage and responsibilities of Global North actors. Thus, even if a company or government complies with all of an MSI’s standards, critical human rights abuses may continue. Yet few external actors—whether policymakers or consumers—have the time or expertise necessary to analyze an MSI’s scope or limitations. Rather than transforming the underlying conditions or practices that lead to abuse, MSIs thus risk embedding certain business-as-usual practices and creating a misperception that they are effectively addressing human rights concerns when they are not.

**SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS:**

MSIs can draw attention away from the full extent of human rights abuses in an industry or create a misperception that they are being adequately addressed:

- Some MSI names, mission statements, or communication strategies may suggest that they address a broader range of issues than their standards actually do. Over three-quarters of MSIs in our MSI Database use “sustainable,” “fair,” “equitable,” or “responsible” in their name or mission. However, uncovering their true scope requires expertise and close reading of technical documents that many individuals are unlikely to undertake. For example:
  - Although many supply-chain MSIs claim to address the economic well-being of workers, an analysis of eight prominent supply-chain MSIs reveals that—while more than half of the initiatives loosely encourage or mention providing workers with a living or fair wage—only one initiative actually requires that workers are paid a living wage within a fixed timeframe.
  - An analysis of seven prominent certification MSIs reveals that “certified” products like coffee, wood, or palm oil might be tainted with serious human rights violations that occur beyond the initial point of production, such as when goods are washed, packaged or shipped.
  - Other MSIs have an explicitly narrow focus, but do little to acknowledge the wider human rights problems in an industry beyond those covered by their standards.

**MSIs sometimes create standards that are too weak to ensure that the underlying issue is actually being addressed.** This tends to happen through: (1) setting standards that are weaker than international human rights norms or are otherwise regressive; (2) using ambiguous language; (3) relying on processes that lack sufficient detail or rigor to ensure they lead to the protection of rights; (4) making key standards “optional”; and (5) only applying to selective aspects of a business operation or supply chain.

Many MSIs have set standards that assign responsibility to less-resourced actors—mainly producers and entities in the Global South—while ignoring more powerful actors in the Global North. These MSIs risk failing to address the underlying drivers of abuse. For example:

- MSIs that include governments as members have not placed obligations on “home states” (the countries where multinational companies are headquartered) despite the relative power that Global North governments have over those companies. Instead, they focus on placing obligations on “host state” governments, who tend to have less economic or political power over foreign corporations.
- Supply-chain MSIs do not tend to address the purchasing practices of powerful brands that drive human rights abuses along the supply chain, such as setting below-cost prices or demanding short lead times. For example, only two of the eight prominent supply-chain MSIs we analyzed explicitly recognize the need for responsible purchasing practices. Nor do MSIs adequately disclose the extent of abuses found in brands’ supply chains.
- Placing certification costs and burdens exclusively on producers might lead employers to cut costs by creating unsafe working conditions or engaging in harmful labor practices. It also risks excluding the world’s poorest farmers and factories from participating in MSIs, thereby exacerbating economic inequality.
INSIGHT 04: Monitoring & Compliance

MSIs employ inadequate methods to detect human rights abuses and uphold standards.

MSIs put considerable emphasis on the standards that they set, but have not developed effective mechanisms for detecting abuses, enforcing compliance with those standards, or transparently disclosing levels of compliance. Despite the emergence of models that enable rights holders to legally enforce MSIs’ standards or to be actively engaged in monitoring companies for abuses, MSIs have not adopted them. By focusing on setting standards without adequately ensuring if members are following those standards, MSIs risk providing companies and governments with powerful reputational benefits despite the persistence of rights abuses.

SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS:

**MSIs employ inadequate methods to detect human rights abuses.** MSIs that monitor their members’ compliance with MSI standards do so through top-down professionalized audits. These approaches do not take into account the power imbalances between rights holders and MSI members that may inhibit rights holders from reporting abuse or prevent auditors from detecting abuse. For example:

- In reviewing the monitoring procedures of the 10 newest and 10 oldest MSIs, we found that no single MSI had procedural requirements that address the spectrum of issues rights holders may face when attempting to speak out about abuses, such as offering protection against reprisals or ensuring evaluators speak local languages/use an independent interpreter.
- The majority of MSIs do not require any unannounced audits or spot checks.
- There are now many well-documented failures to detect violations that have resulted in harm or abuse, such as audited factories collapsing or catching fire, or the documentation of severe labor abuses in farms or factories that have been certified by MSIs. Yet, despite the increasing evidence about the inherent limitations of MSI approaches to monitoring, most MSIs have not evolved to adopt rights holder-centric models.

**MSIs have weak measures for upholding or enforcing compliance.**

- MSIs respond to issues of serious non-compliance through their boards or certification bodies. If a member disputes a report or allegation of non-compliance, the processes become vulnerable to delay and indecision. There are many examples of this. In worst-case scenarios, members withdraw if they do not want to remediate or address abuses.

- Models have emerged that enable rights holders to enforce compliance, for example by requiring members to put legally-binding terms reflecting an initiative’s standards in their contracts. However, MSIs have not adopted them and thus compliance remains dependent on the willingness of members to meet MSI standards.

**Many MSIs are not transparent about the extent of member compliance with standards.** Basic information is often unavailable or incomplete. For example:

- Only half of the MSIs we reviewed that monitor compliance publish monitoring reports online, and the quality of these reports varies considerably.
- Only 11 out of the 18 MSIs with the power to discipline members provide a list of members who have been suspended or expelled.

LEARN MORE ABOUT THIS INSIGHT ON OUR WEBSITE »
INSIGHT 05: Remedy

MSIs are not designed to provide rights holders with access to effective remedy.

MSIs do not provide access to effective remedies for victims of human rights violations. Many MSIs either do not have a grievance mechanism or, if one exists, they have not developed procedures that meet internationally accepted minimum practices or engender trust among rights holders. By failing to provide rights holders with a route to an effective grievance mechanism, MSIs are not only allowing governance gaps to persist, but are also failing to serve the needs of rights holders and to recognize that harmed rights holders ought to be a privileged stakeholder in human rights interventions.

SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS:

Almost a third of MSIs do not have a grievance mechanism, and therefore, do not provide individuals or communities with the ability to seek remedy for rights violations. Most of those MSIs instead require that their members have a grievance mechanism where rights holders can file complaints, but do not set sufficient standards to ensure that those mechanisms are designed or functioning effectively to enable rights holders to seek remedies.

Of those MSIs with grievance mechanisms, nearly all of their complaints procedures fail to meet internationally recognized criteria for effective access to remedy.

- **Not accessible:** Nearly all MSIs lack adequate procedures to ensure rights holders know about and can use the complaint process. For example, only 10 MSIs provide complaint information online in a language other than English, and even fewer MSIs offer translation or require that their members publicize the existence of the MSI’s grievance mechanism to rights holders.
- **Not predictable:** Most mechanisms either do not set out a clear procedure and time frame for each stage of the complaints process, or do not clarify and provide transparency about possible outcomes.
- **Not equitable:** Many grievance procedures are complex and confusing to understand, yet most MSIs place little emphasis on equitable access to information, advice and expertise. Only 6 MSIs formally offer any form of assistance to complainants, such as making an advocate available or assisting with complaint preparation.
- **Not transparent:** Only 7 out of the 27 MSIs with a grievance mechanism disclose specific outcomes of complaints received, and only 4 MSIs publish the overall number of complaints filed or resolved.
- **Not rights-compatible:** Few MSIs appear to have the power or practice of providing meaningful remedies directly to rights holders. Only 3 MSIs have procedures that specifically require input from harmed rights holders when determining the appropriate remedy.
- **Not a source of continuous learning:** Complaints from rights holders contain important information about an MSI’s weaknesses, impacts, and areas of improvement. However, only 8 MSIs have procedures requiring an analysis of complaints, and only 4 have published any form of analysis.

MSI grievance mechanisms are not rights holder-centric: MSI grievance procedures indicate most MSIs do not view harmed rights holders as a privileged stakeholder, or see their role as championing access to effective remedy.
INSIGHT 06: Impact

There is little evidence that MSIs are meaningfully protecting rights holders or closing governance gaps

If MSIs are going to be relied upon by policymakers, businesses, donors, and civil society organizations as tools for closing governance gaps or achieving rights protection, then there ought to be evidence that they are fit for that purpose. Nearly three decades since the first MSIs emerged, such evidence remains scant. While MSIs often promote themselves as successful, without an understanding of their actual impacts on rights holders, they risk creating the perception that the issues and abuses associated with an industry, country, or company have been addressed—when in fact they may still be occurring.

SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS:

Unsubstantiated claims or no evidence: The majority of the 20 oldest MSIs in our MSI Database either claim to have broad positive impacts on rights holders without sharing any evidence to back their assertions or else do not have public information about their impacts.

Little focus on measuring their impacts on rights holders: Only 5 of the 20 oldest MSIs have conducted any direct measurement of their impacts on rights holders in the last five years.

Conflating scale with impact: MSIs often promote their growth or the scale of their operations—such as the number of factories that have been audited or countries that they cover—as evidence of their success or “impact,” rather than reflect on whether they are achieving their desired impact on people or the planet.

Weak methodologies: Even among the MSIs that do measure impact, their studies are of variable quality and do not allow general conclusions to be drawn about their impact on rights holders. These MSIs often fail to approach impact measurement in a systematic or overarching manner, to examine if they are having any unintended consequences, or to recognize rights holders as partners in impact measurement.

Limited evidence of impact on rights holders: Overall, the systematic reviews of the evidence of MSIs’ impacts by academics and other researchers point to sparse, limited, and often context-specific benefits for rights holders—if any. In particular:

• A growing body of research questions the effectiveness of voluntary standards and auditing in improving labor conditions.
• Evidence of the impact of government transparency MSIs is sparse.
• The majority of external research into MSIs is focused on agricultural or forestry MSIs and these studies point to mixed and inconclusive results.
DOWNLOAD THE FULL REPORT AT » www.msi-integrity.org/not-fit-for-purpose/

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